We consider "time-of-use" pricing as a technique for matching supply and demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Relevant examples include energy, computing resources on a cloud computing platform, and charging stations for electric vehicles, among many others. A client/job in this setting has a window of time during which he needs service, and a particular value for obtaining it. We assume a stochastic model for demand, where each job materializes with some probability via an independent Bernoulli trial. Given a per-time-unit pricing of resources, any realized job will rst try to get served by the cheapest available resource in its window and, failing that, will try to nd service at the next cheapest available resource, and so on. Thus, the natural stochastic uctuations in demand have the potential to lead to cascading overload events. Our main result shows that setting prices so as to optimally handle the expected demand works well: with high probability, when the actual demand is instantiated, the system is stable and the expected value of the jobs served is very close to that of the optimal o ine algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
For many commodities of a temporal nature such as electricity, demand and supply uctuate stochastically over time. For example, home owners use more electricity during evenings and weekends, o ces use more during normal working hours, and energy usage at factories can follow an altogether di erent cycle depending on workloads. On the other hand, supply from sources of renewable energy depends on weather conditions and can also vary signi cantly over time. Likewise, demand for computing resources on a cloud computing platform varies over time depending on users' workloads. Supply also varies stochastically, depending on scheduled and unscheduled downtime for servers and other kinds of outages.
In recent years, time-of-use pricing has emerged as an e ective mechanism for "load shifting" for temporal commodities. For example, the California Public Utilities Commision has proposed transitioning all residential electricity customers to time-of-use rates by 2019 [1, 2] . Cloud services such as Amazon's EC2 use spot markets to tailor resource prices to uctuating demand and supply [3] . In such systems, resource prices are higher during high demand/lean supply periods and lower during times of excess supply and low demand, thereby incentivizing customers to move temporally exible demand from periods of peak usage to low demand periods.
In this paper, we explore the e ectiveness of time-of-use pricing at achieving e ciency of allocation for temporal resources. We ask: is it possible to obtain near optimal resource allocation using time-of-use pricing when demand arrives online and customers are strategic? If so, how should the prices be set?
A formal model for online allocation of temporal resources: Suppose that there are B t units of resource available at time t and each potential client, a.k.a. "job", j has a window of time during which it would like to obtain "service", say, a unit allocation of the resource. Job j obtains a value of j from getting serviced at any time in its window. (See gure below.) We consider the following model of job arrival that is a hybrid of stochastic and adversarial models: job j is realized with probability q j via an independent Bernoulli trial. Jobs arrive online in the system in an adversarial order that can depend on the set of realized jobs. The supplier announces a per-unit price p t for each period of time, t, and each job upon arrival is allocated the cheapest available resource that meets its requirements. 1 The supplier's goal is to maximize the total expected value 2 of the jobs that are served.
For a single time period in isolation, determining the right price to set is a newsvendor problem [24] . The optimal solution is to set the price so that the system is slightly overprovisioned with the expected supply matching the expected demand plus a small reserve. Even for this setting, if jobs arrive in adversarial order, Ω(ϵ −2 ln(ϵ −1 )) units of resource are needed to guarantee that the expected value of the jobs served is at least 1 − ϵ times the expected value of the jobs scheduled by the optimal o ine algorithm.
For the general case, as a thought experiment, suppose that we only need to satisfy supply constraints in expectation in every time period. This entails solving an "expected LP", which yields a set of prices and automatically matches potential jobs with a cheapest slot in their window. But how well does such a system work under the natural stochastic uctuations that will necessarily occur? The concern is that, because of variability in the realized demand relative to the expected demand, a client may show up and nd that the cheapest slot in his window has already been allocated. This will cause him to try to take the next cheapest slot and so on. Such "overload" events, that is, events where demand exceeds supply causing excess demand to be forwarded, are positively correlated across time slots and can exhibit cascading behavior. 3 Our main theorem is that such time-of-use pricing works well with high probability: Suppose that B t resources are available at each time t, where B t = Ω(ϵ −2 ln(ϵ −1 )). (We call this the "large market assumption.") Given the model of job arrivals described above, there is a set of prices (p t ) such that if (a) realized jobs arrive online in an adversarial order, and (b) upon arrival, each job grabs his favorite available resource given the prices, the expected value of the jobs served is at least 1 − ϵ times the expected value of the jobs scheduled by the optimal o ine algorithm.
Thus, despite the complex interaction between demand for time slots due to the forwarding of unmet demand and the adversarial arrival order of realized jobs, we can guarantee near-optimal expected performance without increasing capacity over what would be needed in a single time-unit setting.
Key ideas in the proof. The prices we set induce a forwarding graph: the nodes are time slots and an edge from time slot t to time slot t means that p t ≤ p t and some job might try to grab a resource at time t immediately after failing to nd an available resource at time t.
What properties of the forwarding graph determine whether or not overload cascades are likely? Perhaps unsurprisingly, the maximum in-degree of a node in the forwarding graph is key. Suppose, for example, that one time slot t has very high in-degree, meaning that it may receive forwarded jobs from many other time slots. Even if each of the latter time slots has a low probability of forwarding a job, the total expected number of jobs forwarded to t may be high, and may therefore lead to a high probability of overload at t. If all of the highest value jobs happen to have t as the only slot in their window, this could wreak havoc on our social welfare bounds.
What is perhaps somewhat surprising though is that maximum in-degree is the only relevant graph parameter. In particular, the size of the graph does not play a role. Showing that our theorem holds is easy if the forwarding graph is a line or even a boundeddegree tree; the analysis boils down to proving inductively that the number of jobs forwarded from one time slot to the next satis es an exponential tail bound. However, once the graph has cycles, inductive arguments no longer apply. A key part of our proof consists of showing that, among bounded degree graphs, a bounded degree tree will maximize the probability of overload at any time slot. This requires the use of a "decorrelation lemma" that allows us to upper bound the probability of bad dependent events by the probability of bad independent events.
Unfortunately, though, the story doesn't end here, because the forwarding graph induced by our pricing does not in general yield a bounded degree forwarding graph. 4 Nonetheless, we show that the paths created by the forwarding of jobs across time slots possess a simple canonical form that allows us to modify them and obtain a new forwarding graph of in-degree at most 3, without reducing the load at any resource.
Beyond unit-length jobs. We extend the above result to the setting where each job j requires the use of the resource for some number of consecutive time units within its window. This is a signi cantly more complicated problem and, correspondingly, requires a stronger large market assumption. 5 Mechanism design for temporal resources. As an application of our main theorem, we develop a new online mechanism for selling cloud services when jobs are strategic, that achieves a number of desirable properties in addition to being near-optimal for social welfare. The problem of designing truthful mechanisms for scheduling jobs with deadlines has been studied with many variations in the worst case setting: the parameters the job can lie about (arrival, departure, value, etc.), deterministic vs. randomized, whether payments are determined immediately (prompt) or not (tardy), unit length vs. arbitrary (bounded) length jobs, and assuming certain slackness in the deadlines [6, 7, 12, 17, 19] . 6 In the worst case setting, the underlying algorithmic problem (that is, without incentive constraints) already exhibits polylogarithmic hardness [9] . 7 Lavi and Nisan [23] showed that no deterministic truthful mechanism (w.r.t. all the parameters) can approximate social welfare better than a factor T in the worst case, where T is the time horizon, even for unit length jobs on a single machine. Subsequent papers cope with this impossibility by weakening di erent assumptions. In contrast, we consider the 4 Figure 3 shows an example where the in-degree of a time slot can be unbounded. 5 We obtain bounds that match the unit-length case, except for an additional polynomial dependency of the supply requirement on the maximum length of a job. 6 Our work and the others referenced here follow the economic resource allocation model formalized in [8] . 7 The algorithmic problem of stochastic online matching and its generalizations, under large budgets/capacities, are similar in spirit to the stochastic process we consider [4, 5, 13, 14, 16, 18, 22] . The temporal aspects of the two problems are very di erent, however, due to which standard models in that literature such as the random order model are not a good t here.
Bayesian setting, where jobs are drawn from a known distribution. We give a simple order oblivious posted pricing mechanism (OPM), where the seller announces prices, and jobs purchase resources in a greedy rst-come-rst-served fashion. Our mechanism is truthful for jobs' values, requirements, and deadlines; is prompt in that jobs' allocations and payments are determined right at the time of their arrival; and in the stochastic setting, under the large market assumption described above, achieves near-optimal e ciency (a 1 − o(1) approximation). Determining the pricing requires the seller to know the demand distribution. When the demand distributions are cyclic, say with a period of a week or a month or a year, the optimal prices are also cyclic with the same periodicity. The seller can then use a polynomial size linear program to solve for the appropriate prices. If the demand distribution stays constant over time, then a constant price per unit of resource per unit of time su ces to provide near-optimal system e ciency.
OPMs have previously been shown to achieve constant-factor approximations to revenue and social welfare in many di erent settings. See, e.g., [11, 17] , and references therein. Feldman et al. [17] show, in particular, that for settings with many items and many clients with fractionally subadditive values, there always exists an item pricing such that if clients purchase their favorite bundles of items sequentially in arbitrary order, the expected social welfare achieved is at least half of the optimum. For our setting with temporal resources, this implies that when all jobs have unit length, there exists a time-of-use pricing that obtains a half approximation to the optimal social welfare. In contrast, we obtain a (1 − ϵ ) approximation via the same kind of selling mechanism under a large market assumption. Furthermore, while Feldman et al. 's approach can only guarantee an O ( max ) approximation when jobs have lengths in {1, · · · , max }, we are able to use item pricing 8 to again obtain a (1 − ϵ ) approximation under a large market assumption. To our knowledge, this is the rst near-optimal result (1 − o(1)) achieved via OPMs that has no dependence on the length of time the system is running (or, in the setting considered by [17] , the number of items being sold).
Other applications. While the main motivation for our work is to analyze pricing schemes for temporal resources, our analysis applies to other resource allocation settings where clients have varied preferences over di erent resources and greedily grab the rst available resource on their preference list at their time of arrival. Consider, for example, a network of charging stations for electric vehicles. A client wishing to charge his EV strategically chooses which station to obtain service at, depending on the price, travel time, etc.; if that station is already at capacity, the client goes to his next favorite station, and so on. Depending on the geography of the area and tra c patterns, if the forwarding graph over charging stations formed by such a movement of clients has constant in-degree at every node, then our results apply, and near optimal e ciency can be achieved. While pricing had previously been studied in the context of EV charging (see, e.g., [26] ), these works focus on optimizing the average case behavior of the system, rather than studying its stochastic behavior.
Connections to queueing theory. Special cases of our models are closely related to standard models in queuing theory, where the demand and supply are stationary (i.e., not changing with time). For example, a special case of our unit length jobs setting corresponds to the standard M/D/B queueing model, with Markovian arrivals, deterministic processing time, and B servers, under the rst-come rst-served (FCFS) queuing discipline. 9 Our result matches the optimal bound for this model in the so-called Hal n-Whitt regime [20] : if the expected demand in every time period is B − Ω( B log(1/δ )), then the overload probability is at most δ . In other words, every arriving job obtains service at the rst time slot in its window with probability 1 − δ .
In the more general model with di erent job lengths, the special case of stationary demand and supply corresponds to the more general M/GIB/B queueing model, where jobs have arbitrary but bounded processing times. Even though optimal bounds in the Hal n-Whitt regime for FCFS have been known for M/M/B and M/D/B queues [15] , GI/M/B queues [20] , GI/D/B queues [21] , and GI/H * 2 /B queues [25] , proving such bounds for M/GIB/B queues with FCFS queuing is a major open problem in queuing theory. We consider a variant of FCFS: we admit only a certain limited number of jobs of any particular length at every time slot. Our result in this setting matches the optimal bound in the Hal n-Whitt regime for this variant, albeit with a polynomial dependency on the maximum length. Our techniques might give a way to prove the same bound for FCFS, which would resolve the open problem regarding M/GIB/B queues mentioned above.
Organization of the paper. Our analysis is divided into four parts. Lemma 2.1 in Section 2 describes properties of a time-of-use pricing that balances supply and demand in every time period in expectation. In Section 3 we analyze the stochastic resource allocation process for a general forwarding graph over resources, and show that the overload probability is related to the in-degree of the forwarding graph. In Section 4 we analyze the temporal resource setting for unit-length jobs, and give a reduction from this setting to a low-degree-forwarding-graph setting. In Section 5 we extend this analysis to arbitrary length jobs. Complete proofs and a detailed discussion of related work can be found in the full version [10] .
PRELIMINARIES AND MAIN RESULTS
Temporal resource allocation problem. We consider a setting where a seller has multiple copies of a reusable resource available to allocate over time. Clients, a.k.a. jobs, reserve a unit of the resource for some length of time, after which that unit again becomes available to be allocated to other jobs. A job j is described by a tuple consisting of a starting time, a deadline, a length, and a value, denoted by (s j ,d j ,l j , j ), with the rst three elements in Z + and the last in R + . The interpretation is that the job can be processed in the interval [s j ,d j ], and requires l j consecutive units of time to complete. The value accrued by processing this job is j . Let W j = [s j ,d j − l j + 1] denote the "job's window" or the interval of time during which the job can be started so as to nish before its deadline. For each t ∈ Z + , at most B t ∈ Z + jobs can be processed in parallel. Our job arrival model: there is a set of potential jobs ; associated with each job j ∈ is a probability q j . A potential job j is realized with probability q j via an independent Bernoulli trial. The order of arrivals of the realized jobs in the system is determined by an adversary who knows the set of realized jobs. 10 A scheduling mechanism, at the time of each job's arrival, determines whether or not to accept a job. In the former case it allocates l j consecutive units of time in the time interval [s j ,d j ], and charges the job a payment p j . Job j derives a utility of j −p j if it is accepted, and 0 otherwise. 11 The objective of the algorithm is to maximize the total value of the jobs processed, a.k.a. the social welfare. The mechanism is required to be truthful in dominant strategies, which means that a job j can not get a higher utility by misreporting any of its parameters. 12 The algorithm knows the set of potential jobs (along with their types as de ned above), their arrival probabilities, and the capacities B t ahead of time, but the realized job arrivals are learned as they happen. The scheduling decision and payment are determined at the time of the jobs' arrival and are irrevocable.
Time of Use pricing. We consider a particularly simple kind of mechanism that announces a "time of use pricing" (p t ) t ∈Z + up front, where p t is the price per unit of resource at time t. The mechanism then requires a job of length l j starting at time t to pay a total price of p t (l j ) = t +l j −1 t =t p t . For every job j, let F j = arg min t ∈W j :p t (l j ) ≤ j {p t (l j )} denote the job's least expensive options within its window, a.k.a. its "favorite" starting slots. A mechanism that assigns every arriving job to one of its favorite slots is trivially truthful. It follows from strong LP duality by a standard argument that with an appropriate choice of prices, such a mechanism obtains nearly the optimal social welfare, if it is only required to satisfy the supply constraints in expectation. See the full version of this paper [10] for the LP and a proof. Let OPT denote the expected maximum social welfare achievable by any feasible (capacity respecting) assignment under this stochastic arrival model. L 2.1. (Fractional assignment lemma) Fix any set of potential jobs , their arrival probabilities, and the capacities B t for all t ∈ Z + . Then for any ϵ > 0, ∃ nonnegative prices (p t ) t ∈Z + and a fractional assignment X j,t ∈ [0, 1] from jobs j ∈ to their favorite slots t ∈ F j , such that, (1) Every job that can a ord to pay the price at its favorite slot is fully scheduled: for every j with
Further, if the distribution is periodic, 13 the prices are also periodic with the same period, and can be computed e ciently.
The asynchronous allocation process. Of course, the actual allocation of slots to jobs happens in an online fashion and the capacity constraints are hard constraints that must be met regardless of which jobs are actually realized. The mechanism we analyze is a greedy rst-come rst-served 14 type mechanism: The slot prices (p t ) t ∈Z + induce a preference ordering over slots for each job j; this is a list of slots t in j's window W j with p t (l j ) < j , in nondecreasing order of price. Let Π j denote the preference ordering 15 of job j over time slots in its window. When job j arrives, it considers time slots in the order of Π j , and gets served at the rst one that has resources available (or doesn't get served if no slot in Π j has leftover capacity). We emphasize that which jobs are realized is determined by the stochastic model described above, but when jobs arrive is determined adversarially, and can depend on which other jobs are realized. 16 For this reason, we call this an "asynchronous allocation process".
Our main theorem shows that with an appropriate choice of ϵ > 0, the asynchronous allocation process corresponding to the price vector given by Lemma 2.1 obtains near-optimal social welfare.
Let l max := max j ∈ l j and B := min t B t . The case when l max = 1 is called the unit length jobs setting. T 2.2. (Stability of service theorem) ∃ a universal constant c such that ∀ ϵ ∈ [0, 1/2], for prices determined by Lemma 2.1 for this ϵ, in the asynchronous allocation process for the temporal resource allocation problem, every arriving job that can a ord the price at its favorite slot gets accepted at such a slot with probability ≥ 1 − ϵ, and the social welfare achieved is ≥ (1 − 2ϵ ) times OPT, if for the unit length jobs case and the general case respectively,
As a step towards proving this theorem, we will study a slightly more abstract setting without prices in the next section: Suppose that the time slots are nodes in a "forwarding graph" G, and that there is an edge from time slot t to time slot t if there is some job j such that t follows t in j's preference ordering Π j . Jobs arrive at the various nodes in the graph 17 and move through this graph until they are successfully served. However, we relax the requirement that each job j must follow Π j ; rather, we allow each job to take an adversarially selected path in the forwarding graph G in its quest for service. We then present conditions on the arrival process, in terms of the maximum indegree of the graph, under which failures are unlikely to cascade.
STABILITY OF SERVICE FOR A NETWORK OF SERVERS
We will analyze the temporal process described above by reducing it to the following network of servers setting:
• There is a set of n servers, which we identify with [n]. Server i can service a total of B i jobs and then expires. • There is a directed forwarding graph G whose vertex set is the n servers [n]. Let d max denote the maximum indegree in G. We will refer to the vertices of G as either servers or nodes. • The number of jobs entering the network at each node is determined by a stochastic process 18 : Denote by A i the number of jobs that enter the network at node i ∈ [n]. The random variables A i are mutually independent.
• Each arriving job j is forwarded through the network G until the job reaches an available server. Server i is available if it has not yet served B i jobs. Thus, if job j enters the network at i, and server i is available, i serves j and j leaves the network. If i has already served B i jobs prior to j's arrival, then job j gets "forwarded" to some neighbor of i in G and tries to get service there, and so on. Job j leaves the network as soon as it is serviced, or it has tried all reachable servers, or it gives up, whichever happens rst. • All aspects of this process other than the external arrival process are assumed to be adversarial: the paths jobs take as they seek an available server, the timing of external arrivals, and the timing of forwarding events.
Our main theorem for this setting gives conditions under which the probability that any speci c job gets served by the rst server it tries is close to 1. Importantly, this probability is independent of n. 
Then for any job j, Pr[j is not served at the rst node on its path] ≤ ϵ. We introduce some more notation before we proceed. For a particular instantiation of the process (as determined by the stochastic job arrivals and the adversarial timing of arrivals and forwards), let P j denote an arriving job j's realized path in G, the set of servers that j tries to get service from. This path begins of course at the node at which j enters the network. Let P = (P j ) denote the collection of all realized paths. Let i (P) denote the number of jobs that attempt to get service at node i (external job arrivals to i as well as forwards), a.k.a. its "load". We say that node i is "overloaded" if i (P) ≥ B i . If a node i forwards a job, then node i must have already served B i other jobs. Thus, the collection of realized paths P satis es the following min-work condition: for every node i, the number of jobs forwarded by i is no more than the number of realized paths P j containing i minus the capacity B i .
We now proceed to sketch a proof of Theorem 3.1. Most of the details can be found in Appendix A. 18 E.g., Potential job j arrives with probability q j .
Consider the load on a single node and suppose that it has constant in-degree. If each of the forwards from its predecessors were independent, and these forwards were few and far between, as captured by a bound on the expectation of the moment generating function, then it can be argued that forwards from this node would also inductively satisfy a similar bound on its moment generating function. The forwards are not independent, so this simple approach does not work. Moreover, G is not necessarily acyclic, so there is not even an obvious order for induction. However, these conditions are satis ed when G is a tree, and our rst lemma formalizes the above approach in this case.
Suppose that the network G is a nite directed tree, that is, it contains no directed cycles and every node has out-degree 1, and that the moment generating function of
Our proof of the Theorem 3.1 will reduce the analysis in a general network to that in an appropriately de ned tree network. The argument has two parts that we outline next. Throughout the proof, we will focus on a particular server u in G.
Part 1: Reducing to a tree for xed arrivals. In the rst part, we x the set of realized paths P (as determined by the stochastic job arrivals and the adversarial timing of arrivals and forwards). This xes the entries a = (a i ) n i=1 , where a i is the number of jobs arriving at node i from outside the network. We then show that if the node u is overloaded for this xed outcome, then there exists a subtree of the network G that is rooted at u, such that if jobs are forwarded exclusively along edges of this tree until service is received (or there is no where else to go), then node u is still overloaded.
More formally, let T be a directed tree rooted at the node u. For a vector of external arrivals a = (a i ) and node i, let T i (a) denote the load on node i (external arrivals plus forwards) when jobs are forwarded along the edges of the tree T until service is received.
Let T (u) denote the set of all directed subtrees of G rooted at node u. The following lemma captures the rst part of our analysis. L 3.2. If a xed set of arrivals (resulting in a particular a) and induced paths P overload a node u in the network G, then ∃ a tree T ∈ T (u) such that u is overloaded with the same set of arrivals a when requests are routed along T . Formally,
The rst step in the proof consists of removing cycles in P while preserving the set of overloaded vertices. In the second step we reroute the paths so that they form a tree. The proof of this lemma is deferred to the appendix. An example is presented in Figure 1 .
Part 2: Reducing to a tree of trees. Lemma 3.2 does not reduce the analysis of the network of servers setting to the analysis of a single tree, because the particular tree that gives the worst-case load on u depends on the realized arrivals a = (a i ) n i=1 . The lemma does show, however, that to complete the proof of Theorem 3.1 it su ces for us to bound the probability Pr max T ∈T (u )
(Recall that A i denotes the number of external arrivals at node i, and that the di erent A i 's are mutually independent.) In order to analyze this quantity, we will construct a new tree network 19 T u over an expanded set of nodes that contains every tree T ∈ T (u) as a subtree. The tree T u is de ned as follows: There is a node P in T u for each simple directed path P in G terminating at u, and there is an edge in T u from P to P , if P = iP for some node i in G. By construction, each tree T in T (u) has a unique isomorphic copy in T u . See Figure 2 . 20 We then consider the network of servers process on T u , under the assumption that for every node P such that P = iP , the number of external arrivals at P is A i , and also that as long as a job is not serviced it is forwarded along the next edge in the tree. Then for any tree T ∈ T (u), the load on the node corresponding to i in the isomorphic copy of T in T u is no smaller than the load on i in T under the same set of arrivals. In particular,
Unfortunately, we cannot analyze T u u (A) as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, since the external arrivals at di erent nodes are correlated. In particular, for each node i in G, there are n i nodes in T u at which the entries A i are the same, where n i is the number of di erent directed simple paths from i to u in G. The key step in the rest of the proof is to show that replacing these by independent draws from the same distribution can only (stochastically) increase the load at u. For this we require the following "decorrelation" lemma: In our setting, the decorrelation lemma implies the following. L 3.4. For each i and directed simple path P from i to u, let A i,P be an independent draw from the distribution of A i , let P i (T ) 
STABILITY OF SERVICE FOR UNIT-LENGTH JOBS
We now return to the temporal resource allocation problem and prove the stability of service theorem, Theorem 2.2, for the special case where each job has unit length, that is, l j = 1 for all j. The non-unit length case is discussed in Section 5. We x ϵ as stated in the theorem, as well as the set of prices given by the fractional assignment lemma (Lemma 2.1). Then, for the asynchronous assignment process induced by these prices, we construct an instance of the network of servers setting discussed in Section 3 that satis es the assumptions made in Theorem 3.1. Applying that theorem would then imply Theorem 2.2.
The obvious way to reduce from the temporal setting to the network of servers setting was described at the end of Section 2: construct a forwarding graph G over the set of all time slots t ∈ Z + so that it contains all edges (t,t ) that are in some job's preference time price t t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Figure 3 : This gure illustrates that the temporal process can have high in-degree. Suppose that there are jobs with window [t,t + 1], [t,t + 2], [t,t + 3] and so on. Then all of these jobs would rst try slot t + 1. The nal slot all of these jobs would try is slot t, so there would be an edge in the forwarding graph from each of t + 1, . . . ,t + 5 to t.
order Π j over time slots. 21 Unfortunately, the graph so de ned can have unbounded in-degree. See Figure 3 . Observe though that in this example, the path of every job that is forwarded to node t goes through the node t + 1. As such, each of these jobs is e ectively forwarded from t + 1 to t. Taking inspiration from this example, we will proceed as follows. For every instantiation of job arrivals and preference orderings, we will de ne a canonical "shortcutting" of the jobs' paths, such that the overload status of every time slot is maintained. We will then show that the union of the shortcut paths over all possible instantiations de nes a bounded degree graph. We can then apply Theorem 3.1. We give a brief overview of this argument below. Details can be found in Appendix B.
The network of servers. We begin by de ning a directed graph D on the set of all time slots Z + as follows. For every time slot t ∈ Z + , de ne (t ) = max{s < t : p s ≤ p t } and r (t ) = min{s > t : p s < p t } to be the left and right "parents" of t. Let E F := {( (t ),t ) ∪ (r (t ),t ) ∀t ∈ Z + }; we call this the set of forward edges.
we call this the set of backward edges. The directed graph D on vertex set Z + is then de ned as D := (Z + ,E F ∪ E B ). Observe that every node t ∈ Z + in this graph has in-degree at most 3. Figure 4 illustrates the forward edges in this construction. LetD denote the graph formed by just the forward edges:D = (Z + ,E F ). For any t ∈ Z + , let C (t ) denote the ancestors of t inD, that is, C (t ) = {s such that there is a path inD from s to t }.
The reduction. We now consider the network of servers setting over the graph D, and describe a speci c realization of jobs and paths for every realization of jobs and paths in the temporal setting. The set of arriving jobs and their entry nodes are the same in the two settings. We need to rede ne the realized paths of the jobs to follow the edges in D.
Recall that in the temporal setting, each arriving job had a preference ordering Π j over time slots in its window. We complete the description of Π j by specifying how ties are broken: Π j begins at the node j ∈ F j to which it is assigned in the fractional assignment 22 returned by Lemma 2.1. It then visits other nodes in F j , if any, in a particular order: rst, it visits all nodes t ∈ F j with 22 Note that this node may be a random variable, but is always among the favorite nodes of the job. The job is indi erent over all the nodes over which we tie-break. t < j in decreasing order of time, then it visits all nodes t ∈ F j with t > j in increasing order of time. Having visited all of the least price slots in its window, the job then visits all slots of the next smallest price in its window in increasing order of time, and so on. See Figure 5 for an illustration. Let P j be the realized path of job j, namely, the pre x of Π j from j to the node (call it z j ) where the job receives service or exits the process. We use P 1 j to denote the pre x of this path which visits nodes t ∈ F j with t < j in decreasing order of time; this always contains the node j . The remaining su x of P j , if non-empty, is denoted P 2 j . Observe that every edge in P 1 j is a backward edge. However, edges in P 2 j don't necessarily belong to D. LetP 2 j = P 2 j ∩ C (z j ), in other words, we remove from P 2 j all of the nodes that are not ancestors of z j in the graph formed by the forward edges,D. The resulting path is a short-cut of the original path of the job. We now de neP j , a path from j to z j , as follows. If z j ∈ P 1 j , thenP j := P 1 j ; otherwise, we de ne an appropriate pre x of P 1 j calledP 1 j , and setP j =P 1 j ∪P 2 j . Observe thatP j is a short-cutting of P j . Furthermore, every node that we short-cut in this process forwarded the job j, and is therefore overloaded. We can now prove the following two lemmas. See Figure 6 for an illustration of the short-cutting procedure. We are now ready to prove the stability of service theorem for unit-length jobs. Observe that the instance of the network of items setting described above satis es all of the properties required by Theorem 3.1. In particular, for every time slot t, the number of arrivals A t is given by j q jX j,t , where {X j,t } is the fractional Figure 6 : The gure on the left displays ancestors of t inD numbered in reverse topological order. The gure on the right displays the shortcutting of the path from Figure 5 . The yellow path is P 1 j , and the red and blue path isP 2 j . In this case,P j = { j } ∪P 2 j . assignment given by Lemma 2.1 andX j,t is a Bernoulli random variable with expectation X j,t . Therefore, it can be veri ed that E e ϵ (A t −B t ) ≤ ϵ 2 /3e for all t, and every job gets serviced with probability at least (1 − ϵ ) times its total fractional assignment.
STABILITY OF SERVICE FOR ARBITRARY LENGTH JOBS
We now turn to the temporal resource allocation problem for jobs of arbitrary lengths, and prove Theorem 2.2. As in Section 4, we x any ϵ > 0, and a set of prices for the time slots as given by Lemma 2.1 for this ϵ. Recall that p t (l ) denotes the total price for l consecutive units of resource starting at time t. A job j of length l j can choose to buy l j or more consecutive units of resource depending on availability at these prices; we call these consecutive units "time blocks" and denote them by the pair (t,l ) where t is the starting time of the block and l its length. The prices induce for each job j a preference ordering Π j over time blocks (t,l ) with t ∈ W j and l ≥ l j , and ties broken appropriately. As in the unit-length case, jobs search for the rst available time block in their preference ordering in adversarial order. Lemma 2.1 guarantees that for every time slot t, the expected number of arriving jobs whose rst block in their preference ordering starts at t is at most
Correlation introduced by non-unit length jobs. As in Section 4 we can think of the movement of jobs as inducing paths in a graph over (starting) time slots. The challenge with non-unit length jobs is that when considering a block (t,l ), they need to check the availability of the resource at each of l di erent slots; in other words, the forwarding decision for such jobs at slot t depends on loads at other neighboring slots, introducing extra correlations in the forwarding process. Alternately, we can think of the movement of jobs as inducing paths in a graph over time blocks. The challenge now is that we don't have a well de ned notion of capacity; rather each time block shares capacity with other overlapping time blocks in a non-trivial manner.
Solution: capacity partitioning. We adopt the second approach. In order to overcome the challenge described above, we decouple capacity constraints at time blocks by arti cially limiting the number of jobs assigned to any block. In particular, we assign a capacity ofB t,l to time block (t,l ). OnceB t,l jobs have been assigned to block (t,l ), even if there are available resources at all slots in the interval [t,t + l − 1], we admit no more jobs at this block. In order to respect the original capacity constraint at a time slot t ∈ Z + , the capacitiesB t,l must satisfy for all t the property that
Two issues remain: (1) How should the capacities be set to satisfy the above per-slot capacity constraints while obtaining good social welfare? (2) What process/graph does this induce over time blocks?
Setting the capacities. We set capacities based on the fractional assignment returned by Lemma 2.1. Let {X j,t } denote this fractional assignment. Then, we setB t,l to be equal to j:l j =l q j X j,t plus a reserve capacity of ϵ B t where ϵ = ϵ/l 2 max . It is immediate that the per-slot capacity constraints are satis ed: for all t ∈ Z + , we have,
Furthermore, the fraction assignment of Lemma 2.1 gives a (1 − ϵ )approximation to social welfare while respecting the block-wise capacity constraints in expectation.
Network over time blocks. We will think of the graph over time blocks as partitioned into l max layers, with layer Γ l = {(t,l )} t ∈Z + corresponding to all blocks of length l. Within each layer, the induced subgraph is a graph over (starting) time slots. Each job's preference ordering, restricted to layer Γ l , is identical to the preference ordering induced in the unit-length case when slot prices are given by p t (l ). Accordingly, we de ne a network D l over Γ l in a manner analogous to the de nition of network D in Section 4 with respect to prices {p t (l )}: D l = (Γ l ,E F,l ∪ E B,l ). Finally, let E L = {((t,l ), (t,l + 1))} t ∈Z + ,l ∈[l max −1] denote "inter-layer" edges that go from each block (t,l ) to block (t,l + 1).
Observe that the network D has maximum in-degree 4. We now argue that the realized path P j of each job j can be "short-cut" into a path in the graph D. Suppose that the realized path of a job j of length l j starts at block ( j ,l j ) and terminates at block (z j ,l ) for l ≥ l j . Observe that if l > l j , prior to considering block (z j ,l ), the job must have considered every block (z j ,l ) with l ∈ [l j ,l − 1]; all of these blocks (z j ,l ) are in P j . Now, de ne the pathP j in two parts as follows. The rst part is a short-cut of the pre x of P j from ( j ,l j ) to (z j ,l j ) de ned over the layer Γ l j as in Section 4. The second part is a sequence of inter-layer edges connecting (z j ,l ) to (z j ,l + 1) for l ∈ [l j ,l − 1].
It is easy to see thatP j is a short-cut of P j and lies in the graph D. Corollary A.3 then implies that the collection of realized paths P = (P j ) satis es the min-work condition and Theorem 3.1 can be applied. It remains to argue that for every block (t,l ), the moment generating function of A t,l −B t,l is bounded, where A t,l is the random number of fresh arrivals at the block. Recall thatB t,l = j:l j =l q j X j,t + ϵ B t where ϵ = ϵ/l 2 max . On the other hand, A t,l = j:l j =l q jX j,t , whereX t,l is a Bernoulli variable with expectation X j,t . So, we have
which for an appropriate constant c is at most ϵ 2 /4e. Here the second inequality used the fact thatB t,l ≥ ϵ B t , and the third used the lower bound on B t from the statement of Theorem 2.2. Therefore, Theorem 3.1 applies and each job is accepted with probability at least 1 − ϵ . We achieve an approximation factor of (1 − ϵ )(1 − ϵ ) ≥ 1 − 2ϵ for social welfare. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.2.
Truthfulness and job payments. Truthfulness of the above mechanism is straightforward to argue: each job is allocated the cheapest block available that meets its requirements at the time of its arrival. Observe that a job of length l j that is allocated block (t,l ) for some l > l j must pay the price p t (l ) (and not the cheaper price p t (l j )) in the above mechanism. It is, however, possible to modify our argument so that the theorem holds also when a job of length l j can buy a slot (t,l ) with l > l j at a price of p t (l j ). This change to the mechanism changes each job's preference ordering and realized path, but realized paths can once again be short-cut to form paths in D, and we obtain the same conclusion as before. Finally, the new mechanism continues to be truthful with respect to jobs' lengths: a job paying p t (l j ) for some block (t,l ) with l > l j is terminated after l steps, so it hurts to report a length smaller than the true length.
A PROOFS FOR THE NETWORK OF SERVERS SETTING A.1 The Tree Setting: Proof of Lemma 3.1
Recall that when the network is a tree, every node , after processing the rst B jobs that arrive at this node, forwards all of the remaining jobs to its parent. Order the nodes in the tree in topological order starting from the leaves. Let F be the number of jobs forwarded by node to its parent, and let
Clearly (P) ≥ B if and only if F > 0. We prove by induction over the topological ordering starting at the leaves that
This su ces to prove the lemma. For details, see [10] .
A.2 Reducing to a Tree: Proof of Lemma 3.2
We will now prove that for every instantiation of arrivals and forwards in the network of servers setting on G and every node u, we can nd a subtree T of G rooted at u, such that the load at u becomes worse when the process is run over the tree T . Before we restate the main result of this section, let us recall some notation. Let a i denote the realized number of jobs arriving at node i in G, and a = (a i ); let P denote the realized paths of jobs. Let T (u) denote the set of all directed subtrees of G rooted at node u, and for T ∈ T (u), let T i (a) denote the load on node i given the realized arrivals a, when jobs that have not yet been served are routed along the tree T . (See Figure 1 .) L 3.2. If a xed set of arrivals (resulting in a particular a) and realized paths P overload a node u in the network G, then ∃ a tree T ∈ T (u) such that u is overloaded with the same set of arrivals when jobs are routed along T . Formally,
The proof of Lemma 3.2 proceeds in several steps.
Step 1: Remove cycles. Throughout the argument we will progressively modify the realized paths of jobs, while maintaining the invariant that every node i must process at least B i jobs before forwarding any jobs. To this end, we say that a set of paths P = (P j ) is valid for arrivals a if there is an ordering of arrival and forwarding events for the realized jobs consistent with the arrivals a, such that the realized path of each job j is exactly P j , and P j is a path in G.
For a directed multi-graph G , let in G (i) and out G (i) denote the in-and out-degrees, respectively, of node i in the multi-graph. We rst show that a set of paths P is valid for a if and only if the multi-graph given by the union of the paths, call it G , satis es the following min-work condition:
A multi-graph G can be decomposed into set of paths that is valid for arrivals a if and only if it satis es the min-work condition (A.1).
P
. The "only-if" direction of the statement follows trivially from the de nition of valid paths. For the "if" direction, de ne
which is the number of departures at node i. (These departures can occur either because a job is processed at i or because its path terminates.) Clearly i a i = i dep i . Construct an s − t ow network, where there is an edge of capacity a i from s to node i, an edge of capacity dep i from node i to t, and an edge from i to j of capacity equal to the number of edges in G from i to j. Clearly, there is an integer ow in which each edge is lled to capacity, and therefore, this ow can be decomposed into paths. Figure 7 : Figure (a) shows a set of arrivals and paths taken. Figure (b) is the induced multigraph G . Figure (c) shows the multigraph G obtained after removing cycles from G (arrivals are not shown). Figure (d) shows a decomposition of G into set of valid paths, as per Claim A.1. (This decomposition is not unique.) All overloaded nodes are still overloaded.
Moreover, the paths are trivially consistent with the property that each node processes min(dep i ,B i ) jobs, since by (A.1), any i with positive outdegree satis es
or in other words,
A.2. Let a = (a i ) be a set of arrivals and P a set of paths that are valid for a. Let G be the multigraph obtained by taking the union of paths in P. Successively remove directed cycles from G to obtain a new acyclic multigraph G . Then G can be decomposed into a set of paths P valid for the arrivals a, with the property that a node i is overloaded under P if and only if it is overloaded under P . That is, for all i,
Prior to the removal of cycles, the paths P satis ed the property (A.1). Since removing a cycle preserves the min-work property (A.1) and the resulting graph is acyclic, by Claim A.1, its edges decompose into a valid set of realized paths. This is the set of paths P . See Figure 7 .
Clearly the in-degree of each node is weakly decreasing. Furthermore, nodes with out-degree = 0 do not belong to any cycles, and so their loads don't change. So we only need to show that (A.3) holds for nodes with out-degree > 0 after removing cycles. This follows from the fact that the out-degree of a node in G is an upper bound on the number of cycles removed that it is part of. By (A.1),
Therefore, if k cycles through queue i are removed during the process of removing cycles, the nal load at i (in-degree plus arrivals) is at least B i , so (A.3) holds.
Via a similar argument, we also obtain the following corollary that will be used in the proof of Lemma 4.2. It allows us to "short-cut" paths without a ecting overload events. Figure 8 : This gure shows the transformations applied to convert the paths into valid paths along a tree (in this case tree T 3 from Figure 1) . Going from the left graph to the middle is the result of removing cycles. The right gure shows the paths obtained once we apply Step 2, which modi es paths to obtain a tree. In this example, the red path was rerouted to go through 3 rather than 2. The load at node 1 is preserved in the transformation from the middle routing to the routing on the right. C A.3. Let a = (a i ) be a set of arrivals and P a set of realized paths valid for a. Consider a path P ∈ P of length at least 2, and let (u 1 ,u 2 ) and (u 2 ,u 3 ) be two consecutive edges in this path. Let P be obtained by removing (short-cutting) the vertex u 2 from P.
Step 2: Modify paths to obtain tree. For the rest of this subsection, we will assume that we are given the arrivals a, a set of valid paths P that form a directed acyclic graph, and a speci c node u. Let G denote the multi-graph formed by taking the union of the paths in P. We complete the proof of Lemma 3.2 by modifying the paths so that they are directed along a tree rooted at u, without decreasing the load on u. The modi ed paths will remain valid.
To this end, we will repeatedly use the following two operations:
Operation 1: Remove an edge (i, j) if j has out-degree 0, and j u.
Operation 2: Suppose that P 1 and P 2 are two edge-disjoint paths that start at i and end at j, and there is a path from j to u. Delete path P 2 and replace it by a duplicate copy of P 1 .
If we begin with a set of paths valid for a, then by Claim A.1, operations 1 and 2 preserve the existence of a set of realized paths that are valid for the arrivals a. Indeed, operation 1 reduces the out-degree of a node. Operation 2 has the following properties:
• It reduces both the in-degree and out-degree of some nodes by 1 (every node on P 2 except for i and j), which preserves (A.1). • It increases both the in-degree and out-degree of some nodes by 1 (nodes on P 1 except for i and j), but only nodes that already had out-degree 1, which also preserves (A.1). • It maintains the out-degree of i and in-degree of j.
We apply these two operations to get our tree as follows: Recall that G is acyclic, and consider the nodes in G in topological order (from sinks to sources), say 1 , . . . , n . Let S i := { 1 , . . . , i }. We inductively apply the above operations so that the subgraph on S i consists of a collection of paths terminating at u, for which the corresponding graph (not multigraph) is a tree directed towards and rooted at u. (This tree could be empty.)
The base case is i = 0 (or the empty set). To extend from S i−1 to S i , we do the following: If all of the out-edges from i are to nodes with out-degree 0, then remove all of these edges (applying operation 1). Otherwise, suppose that i has an edge to some vertex ∈ S i−1 from which there is a path P to u. Pick such a , and the associated path P. Repeat the following two steps until S i satis es the inductive hypothesis:
(1) As long as there is an edge ( , ) with ∈ S i \ u, and out G ( ) = 0, apply operation 1 to remove this edge.
(2) If there is an edge ( i , ) where and there is a path P from to u, nd the rst node j at which the paths P and P intersect. Let P ,j be the pre x of P terminating at j, and let P ,j be the pre x of P terminating at j. Apply operation 2 to the paths P 1 := ( i ,P ,j ),and P 2 := ( i ,P ,j ). (Note that if there is no path P from to u, then by the inductive hypothesis, has out-degree 0, which means the edge ( i , ) will be removed.) This argument completes the proof of Lemma 3.2.
A.3 The Decorrelation Lemma
We will now prove the decorrelation lemma that is needed in our analysis. We use the notation st ≥ to denote stochastic dominance. 
P
. Since the Y 's are independent, for any a,
whereas, recalling that is non-decreasing for each , and setting x * (a) = min −1 (a), 23
(A.5)
Clearly, the RHS of (A.5) is larger for all a than the RHS of (A.4). Therefore, the lemma follows.
We can further generalize the decorrelation lemma as follows.
L A.1. Let h k : n → , k = 1, . . . , N be functions that are non-decreasing in each variable. Let A 1 , . . . ,A n be independent (but not identically distributed random variables) and, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let P i : [N ] → [n i ], for nonnegative integers n i . Then,
where each A i,P i (k ) is an independent draw from the distribution of A i . P . We prove by induction on j that
The base case of j = 0 is immediate. For the induction step, condition on all variables other than A j (which are independent of A j ), and de ne
Thus, it su ces to show that 
. Apply Lemma A.1 with N equal to the number of distinct trees T rooted at u, n equal to the number of queues in the queueing network, h k (A) := T k u (A), i.e., the load on u when the each job follows the routes given by tree T k until it is processed, and n i equal to the number of distinct simple paths from i to u.
B PROOFS FOR THE UNIT-LENGTH JOBS SETTING B.1 Properties of the Graph D
We begin by proving properties of the directed graph D. Recall that D contains three types of edges. For every time slot t ∈ Z + , the "left forward" edges connect t's left parent (t ) to t; the "right forward" edges connect t's right parent r (t ) to it. The "backward" edges are de ned as
Recall that every node t ∈ Z + in this graph has in-degree at most 3. (See Figure 4. )
Recall that C (t ) denotes the ancestors of time slot t inD i.e. C (t ) = {s such that there is a path inD from s to t }. L B.1. (a) For any t, either there is an edge inD from (t ) to r (t ) or vice versa. That is, either (t ) = (r (t )) or r (t ) = r ( (t )).
(b) For any t, the set C (t ) is totally ordered: if t 1 ,t 2 ∈ C (t ), then either t 1 ∈ C (t 2 ) or t 2 ∈ C (t 1 ). Figure 9 : For a particular time slot t, (t ) is the largest time less than t where the price is at most p t , and r (t ) is the smallest time greater than t at which the price is strictly less than p t . Notice that if p (t ) ≤ p r (t ) , then by de nition (t ) = (r (t )).
The right hand side shows the case where p (t ) > p r (t ) . When this happens, then by de nition r (t ) = r ( (t )). 
P
. (a) is proved in the caption of Figure 9 . For (b) we will apply induction on k = |C (t )|. For all t with |C (t )| = 1, the statement is immediate. For k > 1, suppose wlog that (t ) = (r (t )). Then all ancestors of t (other than t itself) are ancestors of r (t ), and therefore, the total order on C (t ) must terminate with r (t ) followed by t. Applying the induction hypothesis to C (r (t )) completes the argument. See Figure 6 for an example of the total ordering.
B.2 Properties of the PathsP j : Proof of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2
Recall that we de ne job j's new pathP j as follows. Let j and z j denote the rst and last nodes on the job's realized path P j . Recall that P 1 j denotes the pre x of P j which visits nodes t ∈ F j with t < j , starting at j , and P 2 j denotes the remaining su x of the path. We begin with a simple property of the su x P 2 j . L B.2. Let t be a node in the path P 2 j for some job j. Then, either (t ) or r (t ) belongs to the job's window W j , and appears before t on the realized path P j .
P
. If neither (t ) or r (t ) are in job j's window, W j = [s j ,d j ], then all prices in the window are at least p t , and all prices in [s j ,t −1] are strictly larger than p t . See Figure 10 . Since the path P j starts at all prices all prices job j window Figure 11 : This gure illustrates the contradiction in the proof of Lemma 4.1. Time t is less than time (s k ) and p t > p (s k ) . This contradicts the fact that t = (t ).
a cheapest slot in the window, it must start at a slot of price p t , at a time t or later. That is, t ∈ F j with j ≥ t. If the path doesn't start at t itself, then by the de nition of P 1 j , t belongs to P 1 j . Finally, if one of (t ) or r (t ) lies in W j , then it is easy to see that job j must visit this slot before it visits t: either the price at this slot is smaller than that of t, or, in the case of (t ), the prices are the same, but the job visits slots to the left of t with prices p t before t.
We now complete our description of the reduction from the temporal setting to the network setting by specifying the pathsP j for each realized job j. Recall that we de neP 2 j = P 2 j ∩ C (z j ) to be a "short-cutting" of the su x P 2 j . Let s 1 be the rst node on the pathP 2 j . By Lemma B.2, one of the parents of s 1 lies in P j . Call this parent s 0 . Since s 0 appears before s 1 in P j , it must be the case that s 0 ∈ P 1 j . LetP 1 j be the pre x of P 1 j from j to s 0 . De neP j =P 1 j ∪P 2 j if P 2 j is non-empty, andP j = P 1 j otherwise. We will now prove that the new pathsP j lie in the graph D. (See Figure 6 .) L 4.1. PathsP j as de ned above lie in the graph D.
. Consider a job j. The pathP j consists of three components: (1) a pre x of the path P 1 j , (2) the edge (s 0 ,s 1 ), where s 1 is the rst node onP 2 j and s 0 is its ancestor on P 1 j , and, (3) the path P 2 j = P 2 j ∩C (z j ). Observe that the edges in path P 1 j are all backward edges. Therefore, they lie in the graph D. The edge (s 0 ,s 1 ) lies iñ D by construction, and by recalling that Lemma B.2 implies that one of the parents of s 1 lies in P 1 j . We will now focus on the path P 2 j = P 2 j ∩ C (z j ). LetP 2 j = {s 1 ,s 2 , · · · ,s k }, for some k ≥ 1 where s k = z j . We claim that for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,k − 1}, (s i ,s i+1 ) is an edge inD.
We prove the claim by induction on the length k ofP 2 j : Consider the last node s k inP 2 j . Suppose, without loss of generality, that (s k ) = (r (s k )). We will prove that either s k−1 = (s k ) or s k −1 = r (s k ). Once this is proved, we simply use the fact that there is an edge (s k −1 ,s k ) inD, and complete the argument by applying the inductive hypothesis to (s 1 , . . . ,s k −1 ).
Suppose then that s k −1 is not r (s k ) or (s k ). Since all ancestors of s k except s k itself are ancestors of r (s k ), and P j doesn't go through r (s k ), it must be that r (s k ) is outside the job's window W j . Thus, we have: • s k −1 is an earlier time than (s k ): this follows from the fact that all prices in [ (s k ) + 1,r (s k ) − 1] are too high to come before s k in P 2 j ; see Figure 11 . • (s k ) is visited by j prior to s k−1 : by Lemma B.2, since r (s k ) P j , and s k ∈ P 2 j , it must be that (s k ) ∈ P j and is visited by P j before s k , and therefore also before s k −1 .
• The price at (s k ) is strictly smaller than that at s k−1 : if the prices at the two slots were equal, noting that s k −1 < (s k ) would imply s k −1 ∈ P 1 j , but we know that s k −1 ∈ P 2 j .
• There is a path Q inD from (s k ) to s k −1 to r (s k ) to s k : this follows from the total order on ancestors of s k , because all of these nodes (including s k −1 by virtue of it being inP 2 j ) are ancestors of s k . • The path Q contains an edge (t ,t ) where t < (s k ) and t ≥ r (s k ).
But the nal observation yields a contradiction: since the edge (t ,t ) goes left to right, it would have to be that t = (t ). But that can't be, since (t ) also has price less than p t and is further to the right. See Figure 11 . This completes the proof. 
. This follows by repeatedly applying Corollary A.3.
B.3 Proof of the Stability of Service Theorem for Unit-Length Jobs
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.2 for the special case of unitlength jobs. Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 imply that the (random) collection of pathsP forms a valid instance of the network of servers setting with graph D. It remains to argue that the moment generating function of A t − B t for every node t is small. Let {X j,t } be the fractional assignment given by Lemma 2.1 for ϵ picked in the statement of the theorem. Recall that j q j X j,t ≤ (1 − ϵ )B t and A t = j q jX j,t , whereX j,t is a Bernoulli random variable with expectation X j,t . Then we have:
for an appropriate choice of c. We can therefore apply Theorem 3.1 and the unit-length case of Theorem 2.2 follows.
